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Simulation of continuous variable quantum games without entanglement
Shang-Bin Li∗
Research and development department of Amertron optoelectronic
(Kunshan) Ltd., Jingde road 28, kunshan, Suzhou, P.R. China
A simulation scheme of quantum version of Cournot’s Duopoly is proposed, in which there is a
new Nash equilibrium that may be also Pareto optimal without any entanglement involved. The
unique property of this simulation scheme is decoherence-free against the symmetric photon loss.
Furthermore, we analyze the effects of the asymmetric information on this simulation scheme and
investigate the case of asymmetric game caused by asymmetric photon loss. A second-order phase
transition-like behavior of the average profits of the firm 1 and firm 2 in Nash equilibrium can be
observed with the change of the degree of asymmetry of the information or the degree of ”virtual
cooperation”. It is also found that asymmetric photon loss in this simulation scheme plays a similar
role with the asymmetric entangled states in the quantum game.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 03.67.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, significant interests have been focused on
generalizing the classical notion of game theory to an
analogous quantum version [1, 2], the so-called quan-
tum game theory, which is a new born branch of quan-
tum information theory. Quantum games and quantum
strategies can exploit both quantum superposition [1, 3]
and quantum entanglement [2, 4]. Meyer has pointed the
way for generalizing the classical game theory to quan-
tum domain by utilizing the quantum superposition [1],
though it has been argued that the Meyer’s scheme can
be classically realized [3]. By making use of the entan-
glement resource, the Prisoner’s Dilemma has been quan-
tized through the scheme of Eisert et al. and shown that
the game ceases to pose a dilemma if a restricted quan-
tum strategies are allowed for [2, 5, 6], which has been
experimentally demonstrated by Du et al. [7]. Since then
more work has been done on quantum prisoners’ dilemma
[8–11] and a number of other games have been general-
ized to the quantum realm (For review, see Refs.[12, 28]
and references therein). Besides those games in which the
players have finite number of strategies, the quantization
of classical Cournot’s duopoly in which the players can
access to a continuous set of classical strategies has been
also investigated [13–20]. Classical Cournot’s duopoly
exhibits a dilemma-like situation, in which the unique
Nash equilibrium is inferior to the Pareto optimum. For
the quantum version of Cournot’s duopoly, even though
two players both act as ”selfishly” in the quantum game,
they are found to virtually cooperate due to the quantum
entanglement between them [13]. However, entanglement
is usually very fragile against the decoherence caused by
the interaction with the surrounding environment. The
advantage of most of the previous quantum games are
not robust against the noise [21] and the unique proper-
ties of various quantum games different from their clas-
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sical counterpart will disappear in the limit of decoher-
ence [22, 23]. However, Chen et al. have discussed deco-
herence in quantum prisoners’ dilemma [24], and found
some kinds of decoherence have no effects on the Nash
equilibria in the quantized prisoners’ dilemma with max-
imally entangled states. Here, we present the simula-
tion schemes of the quantized symmetric or asymmetric
Cournot’s Duopoly, in which there is not any entangle-
ment involved. However, the players can also escape the
dilemma-like situation. In this scheme, classical measur-
ing apparatus provides more profits than the quantum
measuring apparatus. In the asymmetric game, ”virtual
cooperation” does not give any advantage to the weaker
of two firms if the degree of the asymmetry exceeds cer-
tain threshold value. The most significant aspect of this
scheme is its symmetric decoherence-free, namely certain
kind of symmetric decoherence does not alter the unique
property of this quantized Cournot’s duopoly.
II. CONTINUOUS VARIABLE QUANTUM
GAME WITHOUT ENTANGLEMENT
To make this paper self-contained, we briefly outline
the classical Cournot’s duopoly and its quantization ver-
sion in Ref.[13]. In a simple version of Cournot’s model
for the duopoly, two firms simultaneously decide the
quantities q1 and q2 respectively of a homogeneous prod-
uct released on the market. Suppose Q is the total quan-
tity, i.e., Q = q1 + q2, and the market-clearing price is
given by P (Q) = a − Q for Q ≤ a and P (Q) = 0 for
Q > a. The unit cost of producing the product is as-
sumed to be c with c < a. The payoffs or profits of the
firms can be written as
ui(q1, q2) = qi[P (Q)− c] = qi[k − (q1 + q2)], (1)
where k = a − c is a constant and i = 1, 2. Solving for
the Nash equilibrium (immune to unilateral deviations)
yields the cournot equilibrium,
q∗1 = q
∗
2 =
k
3
. (2)
2At this equilibrium the payoff for the firm i (i = 1, 2) is
k2/9, which is not the optimal solution. If two firms can
cooperate and restrict their quantities to q′1 = q
′
2 = k/4,
they can both get higher payoff k2/8, which is the highest
profits they can attain in this symmetric game. However,
in a competing game, the objective of each firm is to
maximize its individual payoff, and avoid the unilateral
deviation causing decrease of its profit. This individual
rationality confines the strategies of two firms in the Nash
equilibrium point.
The quantization version of the classical Cournot’s
duopoly showed that quantum entanglement creates vir-
tual cooperation of two firms and the larger entangle-
ment can guarantee the players (in the Nash equilib-
rium) a payoff closer to the highest feasible payoff, i.e.
the Pareto-optimal payoff. Notwithstanding the domina-
tion role of entanglement in various quantum strategies,
we attempt to present a simulation scheme of quantized
Cournot’s Duopoly, in which there is not any interme-
diate quantum entanglement involved. We utilize two
single-mode optical fields which are initially in the vac-
uum state |0〉1 ⊗ |0〉2. Then, two optical fields are sent
to firm 1 and firm 2, respectively. The strategic moves
of firm 1 and firm 2 are represented by the displacement
operators Dˆ1 and Dˆ2 locally acted on their individual
optical fields. The players are restricted to choose their
strategies from the sets
Si = {Dˆi(xi) = exp[
√
2
2
xi(a
†
i − ai)]|xi ∈ [0,∞)}, i = 1, 2
(3)
where ai and a
†
i are the annihilation and creation oper-
ators of the ith mode optical field, respectively. In this
stage, the state of the game becomes a direct product of
two coherent states |
√
2
2 x1〉 and |
√
2
2 x2〉,
|ψ〉 = |
√
2
2
x1〉 ⊗ |
√
2
2
x2〉. (4)
Having executed their moves, firm 1 and firm 2 forward
their optical fields to the final measurement, prior to
which a beam splitter operation Jˆ(γ) = exp[iγ(a†1a2 +
a†2a1)] (γ ∈ [0, pi4 )) is carried out. Therefore the final
state prior to the measurement can be expressed as
|Ψ〉 = |
√
2
2
x1 cos γ +
√
2
2
ix2 sin γ〉
⊗|
√
2
2
x2 cos γ +
√
2
2
ix1 sin γ〉. (5)
Then, a measurement on the photon number of the opti-
cal fields is carried out, which is usually done by photon-
detector. The measurement is also one of the key issues in
quantum games. Different kinds of measurement schemes
can alter the characteristics of the games [25, 26]. The
measurement schemes mainly depend on the measuring
apparatus used. In what follows, we analyze two kinds of
measuring apparatuses and investigate their influence on
this simulation scheme: (1) ”classical” measuring appa-
ratus which can only give out the expected values of the
photon numbers of the optical fields such as the optical
power meter. (2) quantum measuring apparatus, such as
the highly sensitive quantum photon-counter which can
measure the photon number and its distribution.
A. ’Classical’ measuring apparatus
Firstly, we assume only the expected values of the pho-
ton number of the optical fields are measured by the ’clas-
sical’ measuring apparatus, and the expected values of
the photon number are ni (i = 1, 2), which are regarded
as the individual quantities. Hence the payoffs are given
by
uQi (Dˆ1, Dˆ2) = ui(n1, n2), (6)
where the superscript ”Q” denotes ”quantum”. The clas-
sical Cournot’s Duopoly can be faithfully represented
when Jˆ(γ)|γ=0 = I (the identity operator), in which
the quantities of firm 1 and firm 2 is n1 = x
2
1/2 and
n2 = x
2
2/2, respectively. For the final state in Eq.(5), the
measurement gives the respective quantities of two firms
n1 =
1
2
(x21 cos
2 γ + x22 sin
2 γ),
n2 =
1
2
(x22 cos
2 γ + x21 sin
2 γ). (7)
Then, the quantum profits for two firms are given by
uQ1 (Dˆ1, Dˆ2) =
1
2
(x21 cos
2 γ + x22 sin
2 γ)[k − 1
2
(x21 + x
2
2)],
uQ2 (Dˆ1, Dˆ2) =
1
2
(x22 cos
2 γ + x21 sin
2 γ)[k − 1
2
(x21 + x
2
2)].(8)
Solving for the Nash equilibrium gives the unique one
x∗1 = x
∗
2 =
√
2k cos2 γ
1 + 2 cos2 γ
. (9)
The profits of two firms at this equilibrium are given by
uQ1 = u
Q
2 =
k2 cos2 γ
(1 + 2 cos2 γ)2
. (10)
From Eq.(10), we can see that the profit at the equi-
librium increases from the classical payoff k
2
9 to pareto-
optimal payoff k
2
8 when γ increases in the range of
γ ∈ [0, pi4 ). Obviously, not any intermediate quantum
entanglement has been involved in this scheme. But this
fact does not impede the successful escaping from the
dilemma when γ → pi4 . It is true that complete classical
system can be used to implement the proposed scheme.
For example, by making use of the source of classical light
or electromagnetic wave, two modulators, beam split-
ter, and power meters, one can realize this simulation
3scheme. Though there exists the intermediate entangle-
ment in the quantization scheme of Ref.[13], the final
state in Eq.(11) in Ref.[13] is also not entangled. In this
sense, the present scheme and the one in Ref.[13] can be
regarded as the same kind but with different definitions
of quantum strategies.
B. Quantum measuring apparatus
In this subsection, we assume that a quantum measur-
ing apparatus can be used to measure the photon number
distributions of the optical fields. The measured value of
photon number is regarded as the quantity of the respec-
tive strategy, then the average payoff is calculated based
on the probability distribution of the photon number.
For the final state in Eq.(5), the payoffs are given by
uQi (Dˆ1, Dˆ2) = 〈ui(m1,m2)〉, (11)
where
〈ui(m1,m2)〉 =
∞∑
m1,m2=0
ui(m1,m2)Pm1,m2 (12)
denotes the average of ui(m1,m2) taken over all possible
values of m1 and m2 with the Poisson distribution
Pm1,m2 = e
− 1
2
(x2
1
+x2
2
) (
1
2 (x
2
1 cos
2 γ + x22 sin
2 γ))m1
m1!
(12 (x
2
2 cos
2 γ + x21 sin
2 γ))m2
m2!
. (13)
For simplicity, we assume a and c tend to infinity but
keeping k = a− c ≥ 1 a finite constant. In this case, the
quantum payoffs for two firms are given by
uQ1 (Dˆ1, Dˆ2) =
1
2
(x21 cos
2 γ + x22 sin
2 γ)[k − 1− 1
2
(x21 + x
2
2)],
uQ2 (Dˆ1, Dˆ2) =
1
2
(x22 cos
2 γ + x21 sin
2 γ)[k − 1− 1
2
(x21 + x
2
2)].
(14)
In this case, when Jˆ(γ) = I (the identity operator), the
scheme can not return to the classical Cournot’s Duopoly.
Comparing the payoffs in Eq.(14) and Eq.(8), we can find
that quantum fluctuation causes the reduce of the pay-
offs. Solving for the Nash equilibrium yields the unique
one
x∗1 = x
∗
2 =
√
2(k − 1) cos2 γ
1 + 2 cos2 γ
. (15)
The profits of two firms at this equilibrium are given by
uQ1 = u
Q
2 =
(k − 1)2 cos2 γ
(1 + 2 cos2 γ)2
. (16)
From Eq.(16), we can see that the profit at the equi-
librium increases from the (k−1)
2
9 to
(k−1)2
8 when γ in-
creases from 0 to pi4 . The above results show the scheme
using classical measuring apparatus has advantage to the
scheme using the quantum measuring apparatus.
Here, for avoiding the emergence of the situation
m1 + m2 > a with nonzero probability, after Eq.(13)
it has been assumed a and c tend to infinite but keeping
k = a − c a finite constant, which guarantees the pay-
off summed over m1, m2 from 0 to infinity in Eq.(12)
has the analytical expression in Eq.(14). For very large
but finite value of a and c, the probability Pm1,m2 in
Eq.(13) corresponding to m1 + m2 > a tends to very
very small, and the summation of those terms with
m1+m2 > a in Eq.(12) should be written as the summa-
tion of −cm1Pm1,m2 or −cm2Pm1,m2 which also tends to
small enough to guarantee the payoff well approximated
by the Eq.(14). However, for other cases with small val-
ues of a, the situation becomes very complicate. The
payoff in Eq.(14) is not valid and need to be revised. It
is very difficult to obtain an analytical result in this situ-
ation. Our numerical results show the optimal payoff of
two firms is between k2/8 and (k − 1)2/8 as γ tends to
pi/4. For examples, in the case with a = 6, c = 1, k = 5,
γ = pi/4, the optimal payoff is about 2.02487, which is
near (k−1)2/8 = 2; in the case with a = 10, c = 5, k = 5,
γ = pi/4, the optimal payoff is about 2.00006. Thus it is
conjectured that the conclusion that scheme using clas-
sical measuring apparatus has advantage to the scheme
using the quantum measuring apparatus is valid even in
the cases with small values of a and c.
III. SYMMETRIC DECOHERENCE-FREE
ASPECTS OF THIS QUANTIZED SCHEME
The most significant characteristics of our simulation
scheme is its symmetric decoherence-free. Previous works
have shown that the decoherence could destroy the ad-
vantage of quantum game [21–23]. In our simulation
scheme, the advantage of quantum game is robust against
the symmetric photon-loss, where the decoherence caused
by the photon loss can be described by the following mas-
ter equation [27],
∂ρ(t)
∂t
=
2∑
i=1
κaˆiρ(t)aˆ
†
i −
κ
2
(aˆ†i aˆiρ(t) + ρ(t)aˆ
†
i aˆi), (17)
where κ is the decay rate. ρ(t) represents the whole state
of the firm 1 and firm 2. The evolving state can be ex-
pressed as,
|
√
2
2
x1(t)〉1|
√
2
2
x2(t)〉2 (18)
where |
√
2
2 xi(t)〉i = |
√
2
2 xie
−κ
2
t〉i (i = 1, 2). Then forward
the evolving state into the beam splitter and we have
|Ψ(t)〉 = |
√
2
2
x1e
−κ
2
t cos γ +
√
2
2
ix2e
−κ
2
t sin γ〉
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FIG. 1: (a) The scaled payoff U2/k
2 of the firm 2 and (b)
the scaled payoff U1/k
2 of the firm 1 at Nash equilibrium are
plotted as the function of ∆/k for different values of γ with
θ = 0.5. (Solid line) γ = 0; (Dash line) γ = pi/16; (Dot line)
γ = pi/8; (Dash dot line) γ = 3pi/16; (Dash dot dot line)
γ = (pi
4
)−.
⊗|
√
2
2
x2e
−κ
2
t cos γ +
√
2
2
ix1e
−κ
2
t sin γ〉.(19)
From the above quantum state, we can immediately ob-
tain the following conclusion: If both firms have the
complete information about the photon loss, they can
adjust their strategies according to the transformation
xi → xie κ2 t, which can guarantee the final payoffs are
invariant under the influence of the photon loss process.
IV. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ASPECTS
OF THIS SIMULATION SCHEME
Recently, the quantum game with asymmetric informa-
tion has been investigated and some novel phenomenons
caused by asymmetry of information have been revealed
[14]. It is very interesting to study how the asymmet-
ric information can alter the aspects of the present sim-
ulation scheme of the original quantized game. In the
case with asymmetric information, firm 1 does not know
what c2 (firm 2’s unit cost) is, only knows that c2 = cH
with probability θ and c2 = cL with probability 1 − θ
(cH > cL). Yet firm 2 knows with certainty the unit cost
c2 of its product as well as that of firm 1’s (c1). So, the
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FIG. 2: (a) The scaled payoff U2/k
2 of the firm 2 and (b)
the scaled payoff U1/k
2 of the firm 1 at Nash equilibrium are
plotted as the function of γ for different values of ∆/k with
θ = 0.5. (Solid line) ∆/k = 0; (Dash line) ∆/k = 0.5; (Dot
line) ∆/k = 1; (Dash dot line) ∆/k = 1.5; (Dash dot dot line)
∆/k = 2−.
Eq.(8) should be replaced by
uQ1 (Dˆ1, Dˆ2) =
1
2
(x21 cos
2 γ + x22 sin
2 γ)[a− c1 − 1
2
(x21 + x
2
2)],
uQ2H(Dˆ1, Dˆ2) =
1
2
(x22 cos
2 γ + x21 sin
2 γ)[a− cH − 1
2
(x21 + x
2
2)],
uQ2L(Dˆ1, Dˆ2) =
1
2
(x22 cos
2 γ + x21 sin
2 γ)[a− cL − 1
2
(x21 + x
2
2)].
(20)
For convenience we denote the strategy by xi when it
is Dˆi(xi). Let {x∗1, x∗2H , x∗2L} be the Bayes-Nash equi-
librium. Then x2 = x
∗
2H(L) is chosen to maximize
uQ2H(L)(x
∗
1, x2) and x1 = x
∗
1 is chosen to maximize
θuQ1 (x1, x
∗
2H)+ (1− θ)uQ1 (x1, x∗2L). Solving the three op-
timization problem yields the Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
For simplicity, we assume that c1 = θcH + (1 − θ)cL,
k = a − c1, ∆ = cH − cL. After calculation, the unique
Bayes-Nash equilibrium can be obtained
x∗21 =
2k cos2 γ
1 + 2 cos2 γ
,
x∗22H =
2k cos2 γ − 4 cos4 γ(a− cH)− (1 − θ)∆
1− 4 cos4 γ ,
x∗22L =
2k cos2 γ − 4 cos4 γ(a− cL) + θ∆
1− 4 cos4 γ . (21)
5In the above derivation, it has been assumed that
max[ 2(cH−c1)−kk−(cH−c1) , 0] < cos(2γ). When
2(cH−c1)−k
k−(cH−c1) ≥
cos(2γ) > 0, the unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium can be
obtained
x∗21 =
2 cos2(γ)[θk − θ(1 − θ)∆ + k cos(2γ)]
θ + cos(2γ)[2 + cos(2γ)]
,
x∗22H = 0,
x∗22L =
2 cos2(γ)[θ∆+ (k + θ∆) cos(2γ)]
θ + cos(2γ)[2 + cos(2γ)]
. (22)
In the following, we consider the iterative game. When
2(cH−c1)−k
k−(cH−c1) ≥ cos(2γ) > 0, the average profits in the
iterative game are given by
U¯Q1 = [cos
2 γ(4θ((k +∆(θ − 1))θ + k cos 2γ)
·(−2∆θ2 + 2kθ + 2∆θ + k − 2(k(θ − 3)
+∆(θ − 1)θ) cos 2γ + k cos 4γ) cos2 γ
+(θ − 1)(2(k(θ − 2) + ∆θ(θ + 1)) cos 2γ
+θ(−2k +∆+ 2∆θ +∆cos 4γ))
·(2(∆(θ − 1)θ + k(θ + 2)) cos 2γ
+θ(2k −∆+ 2∆θ −∆cos 4γ)))]
/[4(2θ+ 4 cos 2γ + cos 4γ + 1)2]
U¯Q2 = [cos
2 γ(4θ((k +∆(θ − 1))θ + k cos 2γ)
·(2∆θ2 + 2kθ + k − 2∆− 2(k(θ − 3)
+∆(θ2 − 5θ + 4)) cos 2γ
+(k + 2∆(θ − 1)) cos 4γ) sin2 γ
−(θ − 1)(θ(2k +∆+ 2∆θ +∆cos 4γ)
−2(k(θ − 2) + ∆(θ − 3)θ) cos 2γ)2)]
/[4(2θ+ 4 cos 2γ + cos 4γ + 1)2]. (23)
When max[ 2(cH−c1)−kk−(cH−c1) , 0] < cos(2γ), the average profits
in the iterative game are given by
U¯Q1 =
4[k2 −∆2θ(1 − θ)]
8(2 + cos 2γ)2
+
[4k2 +∆2θ(1− θ) cos 2γ(3 + cos 2γ)] cos 2γ
8(2 + cos 2γ)2
,
U¯Q2 = U¯
Q
1 +
1
4
∆2θ(1 − θ). (24)
From the above results, one can find a boundary
which separates two parameter regions A and B la-
beled by the inequality max[ 2(cH−c1)−kk−(cH−c1) , 0] < cos(2γ)
and max[ 2(cH−c1)−kk−(cH−c1) , 0] ≥ cos(2γ), respectively. In the
parameter region A, the profits in Nash-equilibrium in
Eq.(24) return to the ones of Ref.[14] if replacing cos 2γ
by exp[−2γ] in Ref.[14]. While in the parameter re-
gion B, due to the constraint that the strategy in Bayes-
Nash equilibrium should not exceed the strategy space
[0,∞). we give out the profits of Bayes-Nash equilibrium
in Eq.(23) which is different with the results in Ref.[14].
In Fig.1, the rescaled average profits of the firm 1 and
2 are plotted as the function of ∆/k for different values
of γ. For a fixed value of θ, the degree of asymmetry
ξ ≡ ∆2(1−θ)θk2 is monotonic with ∆/k. The profit of the
firm 2 increases with the degree of asymmetry, and the
profit of the firm 1 decreases with the degree of asymme-
try except for the case with γ = 0, θ = 0.5 and ∆/k < 43 ,
in which the rescaled profit U¯Q1 /k
2 of the firm 1 keeps
fixed. When γ < pi4 , a second-order phase transition-
like behaviors (i.e.
∂U¯Q
i
/k2
∂∆/k (i = 1, 2) is discontinuous) of
the rescaled average profits of the firm 1 and firm 2 in
Bayes-Nash equilibrium may be observed as the degree of
asymmetry varies across the boundary of the parameter
regions A and B. In Fig.2, the rescaled average profits
of the firm 1 and 2 are plotted as the function of γ for
different values of ∆/k. The asymmetric property of this
game can significantly affect the dependence of the aver-
age profits of both firm 1 and 2 on the degree of ”virtual
cooperation” sin(2γ). For θ = 1/2 and 0 < ∆/k < 4
√
3
9 ,
both the profits of the firm 1 and 2 firstly increase with
γ and then decrease with γ. While for larger asymme-
try with θ = 1/2 and 2 > ∆/k > 4
√
3
9 , both the profits
of the firm 1 and 2 decrease with γ. The above results
imply that, in this case, the ”virtual cooperation” has ad-
vantage role only in the nearly symmetric or very small
asymmetric games. If the degree of asymmetry exceeds
a threshold, the ”virtual cooperation” in this game can
suppress the gain of the firm standing on the advantage
side with more information. But for the firm standing on
the disadvantage side due to less information, the ”vir-
tual cooperation” should be regarded as one disaster af-
ter another. Similarly, when θ = 1/2 and ∆/k > 1, a
second-order phase transition-like behaviors (i.e.
∂U¯Q
i
/k2
∂γ
(i = 1, 2) is discontinuous) of the rescaled average prof-
its of the firm 1 and firm 2 in Nash equilibrium can be
observed as the parameter γ varies across the boundary
of the parameter regions A and B. In Fig.3, we calcu-
late the total rescaled profit of firm 1 and 2 versus the
parameters ∆/k or γ for θ = 1/2. It is found that in
the ”ideal virtual cooperation” case with γ = pi4
−, the
total profit in Nash equilibrium is invariant against the
asymmetry of this game. In other cases, the total profit
always increases with ∆/k. The smaller the parameter
γ, the more significant influence of the asymmetry on the
total profit.
V. DECOHERENCE-INDUCED ASYMMETRIC
QUANTUM GAME
In the Ref.[15], by making use of the asymmetrical
entangled states, the quantum model shows some kind
of ”encouraging” and ”suppressing” effect in profit func-
tions of different players. Here we discuss how the asym-
metric decoherence can alter the Bayes-Nash equilibrium
of the above quantized scheme of the Cournot’s Duopoly,
60.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
(b)
 
 
(U
1+
U 2
)/k
2
∆/k
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
(a)
 
 
(U
1+
U 2
)/k
2
γ
FIG. 3: (a) The scaled total payoff (U1 + U2)/k
2 at Nash
equilibrium of two firms is plotted as the function of γ for
different values of ∆/k with θ = 0.5. (Solid line) ∆/k = 0;
(Dash line) ∆/k = 0.5; (Dot line) ∆/k = 1; (Dash dot line)
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2 at Nash equilibrium of two firms is
plotted as the function of ∆/k for different values of γ with
θ = 0.5. (Solid line) γ = 0; (Dash line) γ = pi/16; (Dot line)
γ = pi/8; (Dash dot line) γ = 3pi/16; (Dash dot dot line)
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where the asymmetric decoherence means that two firms
experience two different degrees of decoherence. Let us
consider the following specific case in which the firm 2
encounters a decoherence caused by the photon loss with
the loss rate
√
η = e−κτ/2 (τ ∈ [0,∞)) just before the
final photon counting. Obviously, the final measurement
gives the respective quantities of the two firms
n1 =
1
2
(x21 cos
2 γ + x22 sin
2 γ),
n2 =
η
2
(x22 cos
2 γ + x21 sin
2 γ). (25)
Substituting the Eq.(25) into the payoff function, and
solving the two optimization problems yields the Bayes-
Nash equilibrium. For 0 < η ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ γ ≤ pi4 , the
unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium can be obtained
x∗21 =
8kη cos2 γ
1 + η(6 + η) + 4η cos 2γ − (1− η)2 cos 4γ ,
x∗22 =
8k cos2 γ
1 + η(6 + η) + 4η cos 2γ − (1− η)2 cos 4γ . (26)
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FIG. 4: (a) The scaled payoff U1/k
2 of the firm 1, (b) the
scaled payoff U2/k
2 of the firm 2, and (c) the scaled total
payoff (U1 + U2)/k
2 at Nash equilibrium are plotted as the
functions of γ and η.
Meanwhile, the corresponding profits at the Bayes-Nash
equilibrium can be obtained
UQ1 = ξ[1 + η − (1− η) cos 2γ],
UQ2 = ξη[1 + η + (1− η) cos 2γ], (27)
7where
ξ =
2k2 cos2 γ[(1 + η)2 − (1− η)2 cos2 2γ]
[1 + η(6 + η) + 4η cos 2γ − (1 − η)2 cos 4γ]2 (28)
When η → 0, UQ1 → k
2
4+5δγ,0
and UQ2 → k
2δγ,0
9 , where δγ,0
equals 1 for γ = 0 and is zero elsewhere. When γ = 0,
UQ1 = U
Q
2 =
k2
9 , which shows the payoff does not depend
on η and implies the Nash equilibrium of the classical
game is robust against the asymmetric photon-loss.
In Fig.4, the rescaled profits of two firms in the Nash
equilibrium are plotted as the function of γ and η. For
γ 6= 0, the asymmetric decoherence encourages the profit
UQ1 of the firm 1 and suppresses the profit U
Q
2 of the
firm 2. We can find UQ1 and U
Q
2 exhibit the sharp de-
cline and ascent in the end of asymmetric photon loss for
those cases with very small value of γ 6= 0. In the initial
stage of photon-loss with η > 0.5, ”virtual cooperation”
accelerates the encouragement and suppression effects of
the asymmetric photon loss. The asymmetric photon loss
plays a role in transferring the profit from the firm 2 to
firm 1. Surprisingly, the asymmetric photon loss can im-
prove the total profits of the firm 1 and 2 in the Nash
equilibrium in the situations with 0 < γ < pi4 . In the
ideal ”virtual cooperation”, i.e. γ = pi4 , the total profits
are kept fixed against the asymmetric photon loss.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present a simulation scheme of
the continuous variable quantized Cournot’s duopoly, in
which not any intermediate quantum entanglement has
been involved. The influence of measuring apparatus,
symmetric or asymmetric photon loss, and asymmetric
information on their Nash equilibria has been investi-
gated. It is shown that the scheme using classical mea-
suring apparatus is advantage to the one using the quan-
tum measuring apparatus. Being different from the pre-
vious quantized Cournot’s duopoly involving entangle-
ment, this simulation scheme is also symmetric photon
loss free; While for asymmetric photon loss, the profits
in Nash equilibrium exhibit a transfer from one firm to
the other. Simultaneously, the total profit in Nash equi-
librium increases with the asymmetric photon loss except
for two extreme cases, i.e. the complete no ”virtual co-
operation” case and the ideal ”virtual cooperation” case.
In the cases with asymmetric information, a second-
order phase transition-like behavior of the average prof-
its of the firm 1 and firm 2 in Nash equilibrium can be
observed as the degree of asymmetry or the degree of
”virtual cooperation” vary. The ”virtual cooperation”
has advantage role for total profit in Nash equilibrium
only in the nearly symmetric or very small asymmetric
games. If the degree of asymmetry exceeds a threshold
value, the ”virtual cooperation” in this game can sup-
press the gain of the firm standing on the advantage side
with more information. But for the firm standing on the
disadvantage side due to less information, the ”virtual
cooperation” should be regarded as one disaster after an-
other. For the total profit, it is found that, in the ”ideal
virtual cooperation” case with γ = pi4
−, the total profit
in Nash equilibrium is invariant against the asymmetry
of this game. In other cases with γ < pi4 , the total profit
always increases with ∆/k. The smaller the parameter
γ, the more significant influence of the asymmetry on the
total profit.
[1] D. Meyer, Phys. Rev. Lett. 82, 1052 (1999).
[2] J. Eisert et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 3077 (1999).
[3] S.J. van Enk. Phys. Rev. Lett. 84, 789 (2000); D. A.
Meyer. Phys. Rev. Lett. 84, 790 (2000).
[4] S.J. van Enk, R. Pike, Phys. Rev. A 66, 024306 (2002).
[5] S.C. Benjamin and P.M. Hayden, Phys. Rev. Lett. 87,
069801 (2001).
[6] A.P. Flitney and L.C.L. Hollenberg, Phys. Lett. A 363,
381 (2007).
[7] J. Du, H. Li, X. Xu, M. Shi, J. Wu, X. Zhou, and R.
Han, Phys. Rev. Lett. 88, 137902 (2002).
[8] S.C. Benjamin and P.M. Hayden, Phys. Rev. A 64,
030301 (2001).
[9] A. Iqbal, J. Phys. A: Math. Gen. 37, L353 (2004).
[10] A. Iqbal, S. Weigert, J. Phys. A: Math. Gen. 37 5873
(2004).
[11] S. Cao and M.-F. Fang, Chin. Phys. 15, 276 (2006).
[12] A. Iqbal, Ph.D thesis, Quaid-i-Azam University, Pak-
istan.
[13] H. Li, J. Du and S. Massar, Phys. Lett. A 306, 73 (2002).
[14] J. Du, H. Li, C. Ju, Phys. Rev. E 68, 016124 (2003).
[15] Y. Li, G. Qin, X. Zhou, J. Du, Phys. Lett. A 355, 447
(2006).
[16] C.F. Lo, D. Kiang, Phys. Lett. A 318, 333 (2003).
[17] C.F. Lo, D. Kiang, Phys. Lett. A 346, 65 (2005).
[18] J. Du, C. Ju, and H. Li, J. Phys. A: Math. Gen. 38, 1559
(2005).
[19] J. Zhou, L. Ma, Y. Li, Phys. Lett. A 339, 10 (2005).
[20] G. Qin, X. Chen, M. Sun, X. Zhou, and J. Du, Phys.
Lett. A 340, 78, (2005).
[21] N.F. Johnson, Phys. Rev. A 63, 020302 (2001).
[22] A.P. Flitney, D. Abbott, J. Phys. A: Math. Gen. 38, 449
(2005).
[23] S.K. O¨zdemir, J. Shimamura, and N. Imoto, Phys. Lett.
A 325, 104 (2004).
[24] L.K. Chen, H. Ang, D. Kiang, L.C. Kwek, and C.F. Lo,
Phys. Lett. A 316, 317 (2003).
[25] A. Nawaz, A.H. Toor, J. Phys. A: Math. Gen. 39 2791
(2006).
[26] C.F. Li, Y.S. Zhang, Y.F. Huang, G.C. Guo, Phys. Lett.
A 280, 257 (2001).
[27] S.J.D. Phoenix, Phys. Rev. Lett. 41, 5132 (1990).
[28] H. Guo, J. Zhang and G. J. Koehler, Decis. Support Syst.
846, 318 (2008).
